CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FEDERAL

PREEMPTION-NEW

NLRABrown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees InternationalUnion Local
54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).

JERSEY'S CASINO CONTROL ACT NOT PREEMPTED BY

Fitting the ever-expanding body of Federal labor regulation
into judicial paradigms of an effective federalism has created constant problems of accommodation and conflict.' Just how far the
extensive "radiations of national regulation" 2 should impinge
upon state legislative efforts to supervise local affairs remains a
problematic issue defying predictable resolution. 3 This conundrum was once again exemplified in Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees International Union Local 54,4 where the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the broad Federal
statutory scheme of labor regulations, as established in the National Labor Relations Act 5 (NLRA or Wagner Act), preempted
certain key provisions of the NewJersey Casino Control Act 6 (Casino Act).
Passed in 19777 after extensive public and legislative debate,' the Casino Act sought to tap a viable source of state reveI Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1975).
2 Summers, Preemption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22
OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 119 (1961).
3 See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972)
(discussing development of labor law preemption from 1945-1972); Hirsch, Toward
a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 L.F. 515 (examining preemption problems and
tests and standards Supreme Court has used). One commentator has analogized
the effort to accommodate permanently Federal and state legislation to "trying to
keep a saddle on a jellyfish." Comment, Labor Law Preemption After Sears-Problems
in ConcurrentJurisdiction-Wiggins& Co. v. Retail Clerks Local 1557, 47 TENN. L.
REV. 373, 373 (1980).
4 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
7 The Casino Act was passed pursuant to a 1976 referendum to the NewJersey
Constitution, which allowed for the establishment of casinos in Atlantic City. N.J.
CONST. art. IV, § 7, 1 2D. For a good discussion of prior gambling law in New
Jersey, see Cohen, The New Jersey Casino ControlAct: Creation of a Regulatory System, 6
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 2-5 (1982).
8 See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d
815, 846-47 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984). The Casino
Act was the culmination of a report by the State Commission of Investigation,
months of study by a Staff Policy Group on Casino Gambling designated by the
Attorney General and the State Treasurer at the Governor's request, and much
debate and discussion in the New Jersey Legislature. See Hotel & Restaurant Int'l
Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 536 F. Supp. 317, 322 (D.N.J. 1982), rev'd, 709 F.2d
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nue 9 while curtailing the influx and influence of criminal
elements naturally attracted to the cash-rich casino industry.' 0
Recognizing this potential criminal problem and perceiving the
need to bolster public confidence in the industry," the New
Jersey Legislature designed the Casino Act to establish a strict
and extensive regulatory scheme, which severely limits the participation in the industry of persons with known criminal records,
habits, or associations. 12
815 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l
Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).
9 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d
815, 847 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l
Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984). Under the Casino Act, the state imposes
an annual tax of eight percent on gross casino revenues, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12144, all of which is to be used to provide for "reductions in property taxes, rentals,
telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens
and disabled residents, in accordance with such formulae as the Legislature may by
law provide." N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 2D.
10 The nexus between gambling and organized crime has been widely recognized. At the Federal level, Congress acknowledged the problem when it noted:
[O]rganized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitations; . . . this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions ...
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 536 F. Supp. 317,
323 (D.N.J. 1982), rev'd, 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).
This attitude has also been reflected at the state level. See, e.g., Niglio v. New
Jersey Casino Comm'n, 158 N.J. Super. 182, 188, 385 A.2d 925, 928 (App. Div.
1978) ("The undesirability of an association between those previously convicted of
a crime or those in affinity with such a person and . . . legalized gambling . . . is
too apparent to justify extended discussion."); Nevada Tax Comm'r v. Hicks, 73
Nev. 115, 119, 310 P.2d 852, 854 (1957) ("Throughout this country,. . . gambling
has necessarily surrounded itself with an aura of crime and corruption."); see also
Santaniello, Casino Gambling: The Elements of Effective Control, 6 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
23 (1982) (discussing problems of criminal infusion into casino industry).
I I The Casino Act lists several public policy considerations which served as the
social underpinnings of the legislation's provisions, including:
An integral and essential element of the regulation and control of such casino
facilities by the State rests in the public confidence and trust in the credibility and
integrity of the regulatory process and of casino operations. ...
. . . Continuity and stability in casino gaming operations cannot be achieved at
the risk of permitting persons with unacceptable backgrounds and records of behavior to control casino gaming operations contrary to the vital law enforcement
interests of the State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-lb(6), (15).
12 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 536 F. Supp.
317, 322 (D.N.J. 1982), rev'd, 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984). The

658

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:656

To achieve these goals, the Casino Act created a Casino
Control Commission (Commission) with broad regulatory power
over gambling institutions and related industries.' 3 The Casino
Act also directs the Division of Gaming Enforcement in the Department of Law and Public Safety to investigate all applicants
for licenses, certificates, or permits, and to prosecute violations
of the Act and its promulgated regulations either before the
Commission or in the state criminal courts.14
The Casino Act provides detailed licensing criteria for the
various groups involved directly or indirectly in the casino industry.' 5 For labor unions and their agents, these requirements are
listed in section 93a.' 6 Overarching this licensing scheme is a set
of disqualification criteria, enumerated in section 86, which, if
met, preclude the applicant from participating in the industry.' 7
In 1978, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local 54 (Union)' 8 filed its annual regisstate's intent to expand the scope of the Czsino Act's control to those institutions
and individuals ancillary to the casino industry is made manifest in the Act itself.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-lb(6) provides that "the regulatory provisions of this act are
designed to extend strict State regulation to all persons, locations, practices and
associations related to the operation of licensed casino enterprises and all related
services industries as herein provided."
i3 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d
815, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984). A primary obligation of the Commission is to ensure that only persons of honesty, integrity, and good reputation participate within the casino industry. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-63 to -75.
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-76a.
15 See, e.g., id. § 5:12-89 (licensing of casino key employees); id. § 5:12-90 (licensing of other casino employees); id. § 5:12-92 (licensing of casino service industries).
16 Id. § 5:12-93a.
17 Id. § 5:12-86. Such criteria include convictions of the applicant of any one of
several enumerated crimes listed in the statute. Id. Additional disqualification criteria include the following:
The identification of the applicant or any person who is required to
be qualified under this act as a condition of a casino license as a career
offender or a member of a career offender cartel or an associate of a
career offender or career offender cartel in such a manner which creates
a reasonable belief that the association is of such a nature as to be inimical to the policy of this act and to gaming operations. For purposes of
this section, career offender shall be defined as any person whose behavior is pursued in an occupational manner or context for the purpose of
economic gain, utilizing such methods as are deemed criminal violations
of the public policy of this State.
Id. § 5:12-86f.
Section 86 disqualification criteria are made explicitly applicable to the labor
unions and their agents through section 93b of the Act. Id. § 5:12-93b.
18 The Union is composed of approximately 12,000 members, 8000 of whom are
hotel service employees working for establishments licensed to operate casinos.
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tration statement with the Commission in compliance with
section 93a of the Casino Act.' 9 Following an investigation of the
applicants, the Division of Gaming Enforcement recommended
to the Commission that Frank Gerace, the Union's President,
Robert Lumino, its Secretary-Treasurer, and Frank Materio, its
Grievance Manager, be disqualified under section 86 criteria.20
On August 17, 1981, the Union and Mr. Gerace filed a complaint
asserting that sections 86 and 93 of the Casino Act were preempted by the NLRA, the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 195921 (LMRDA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197422 (ERISA).2 3 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that both sections of the
Casino Act were void, and they requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the enforcement of section 93.24
The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, doubting the ability of the plaintiffs to succeed on the
merits, denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. 25 Consequently, the Commission held a hearing on the Division's report
on September 28, 1982, at which time the Division's position was
adopted. 26 The Commission decided to bar the Union's collection of dues from members working in the casino industry.2 7
Thereafter, the district court enjoined the Commission from enBrown, 104 S. Ct. at 3184. None of the Union members are employed in direct
gambling operations. Id.
19 Id. Section 93 requires in part that "[each labor organization, union or affiliate seeking to represent employees licensed or registered under this act and employed by a casino hotel or a casino licensee shall register with the commission
annually." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93..
20 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185.
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
22 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1381 (1976).
23 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d
815, 819 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l
Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984). The complaint also alleged that section
86f of the Casino Act is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, violating the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Id. The Third Circuit decision did not consider these latter issues because it viewed its holding on the statutory supremacy issues as dispositive. Id. at 883. The Supreme Court likewise
declined to consider those challenges. Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185 n.8.
24 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3184. The plaintiffs supported their allegation by claiming that the Union would be irreparably injured by being forced to participate in
the Commission's proceedings, in violation of section 7 of the NLRA. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 3185. Gerace and Matero, having been associated with members of organized crime, were disqualified under section 86f of the Casino Act. Id.
27 Id.
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forcing this decision, pending an appeal to the Third Circuit. 28 A
divided panel of the court of appeals held that section 93 of the
Casino Act is preempted by section 7 of the NLRA insofar as it
grants the Commission power to disqualify elected union
officials.29
On appeal to the Supreme Court, a plurality reversed, holding that section 93 of the Casino Act is not preempted by section
7 of the NLRA merely because it imposes certain limitations on
who may serve as the casino industry employees' elected representatives.3 0 The Court, however, remanded the case to the
court of appeals with instructions to remand to the district court
to determine whether the imposition of the dues collection ban
would, in effect, prevent the Union from serving as a bargaining
representative for its members; if it did, the Court concluded,
then that particular sentence would be preempted.3 '
32
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
deals with the problem of defining or accommodating the ranges
of legislative power at the Federal and state levels. Since the
Supreme Court is the final authority on matters of constitutional
interpretation, that tribunal has the task of applying the
supremacy clause to the questions of federalism brought before
it. Preemption, one of the primary judicial tools the Court has
used for shaping intergovernmental relations, is the invalidation
of state legislation due to its incompatibility with a constitutional
33
provision or a Federal regulatory scheme.
Traditionally, the preemption doctrine has been viewed as
divisible into two general branches: instances where congressional design to "occupy the field" displaces state action in the
same area, and situations in which a conflict between Federal and
state statutes nullifies the latter.3 4 Under the "occupation"
branch, state action is precluded even though it may not directly
Id.
Id. The appeals court also found section 93 of the Casino Act preempted by
ERISA. Id.
30 Id. at 3192.
31 Id. The Court also vacated the Third Circuit's holding that ERISA preempted
section 93 of the Casino Act. Id. at 3191.
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
33 Note, Pre-emption as a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 208, 209 (1959).
34 See generally Note, supra note 1, at 625-28.
28

29
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impair the operation of Federal law. 5 Therefore, this branch has
rarely been invoked in the absence of either evidence of a clear
and manifest purpose of Congress to exclusively control the
field, or the existence of a regulated subject matter which by nature demands national uniformity and Federal primacy.3 6 In contrast, under the "conflict" branch, even if Congress has not
completely displaced state regulations in a specific area, the
Court construes the scope of both Federal and state legislation
and decides whether an actual conflict exists.3 7 Despite the clarity of theory inherent in these two approaches, in practice the
problem of ascertaining congressional intent, and the difficulty in
determining the quantum of conflict necessary to find the state's
statute repugnant to its Federal counterpart, often force the
Court to rely upon its own notions of an effective federalism. 8
With the advent of the New Deal period and its plethora of
national regulations, the balancing of Federal and state interests
proved increasingly difficult; the power of states to protect the
health and welfare of their citizens and to administer their common law often collided with Federal regulatory advances. 3 9 As a
result, the Supreme Court struggled to accommodate these com40
peting interests.
This judicial effort is well illustrated by the litigation that
arose after the enactment of the NLRA and its progeny. Before
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, labor strife was rampant because employees could not compete on an equal footing
with employers. 4 1 Efforts to organize unions and other collective
units were successfully resisted by management, which profited
by the imbalance, 42 as well as by hostile state courts, which
viewed organized union activity as either "tortious conspiracies
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982); Jones v. Ratz Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
37 Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
38 Note, supra note 1, at 630-33; Note, supra note 33, at 224.
39 See Note, supra note 1, at 624.
40 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) ("In the final analysis, there
can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to
determine whether under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.").
41 See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 670
(1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("For years the law of the jungle applied, victory
going to the strongest.").
42 See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 558 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35
36
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or restraints of trade" that violated antitrust laws.43 The pervasiveness of labor/management conflict convinced Congress that
state courts and legislatures were not able to create the uniform
system of regulations essential to stabilize labor relations. 44 Accordingly, in section 7 of the Wagner Act, Congress sought to
mitigate the raging conflict by providing workers with the rights
to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ' 4 5 Moreover, section 8 lists employer "unfair labor
practices" and prohibits interference by employers and labor organizations with the section 7 rights of union employees. 46 The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established 47 and
given exclusive authority to administer this complex regulatory
scheme and to serve as the prime interpreter of Federal labor
policy.

48

Early attempts by the Supreme Court to interpret this new
legislation revealed the lines of debate that would develop in the
future. In Allen-Bradley Local No. Il1 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,4 9 a union picketed a Wisconsin manufacturer after it
had cancelled the union's employment contract. 50 During the
controversy, threats of personal injury to strikebreakers and of
property damage to the employees' homes were made. 5 '

The

state labor board, pursuant to state legislation prohibiting certain
unfair labor practices, issued a cease and desist order. 52 The
Union, arguing that the state's action interfered with the jurisdiction of the NLRB, petitioned the Supreme Court to declare the
legislation unconstitutional.53
In refusing to find the state action preempted, the Supreme
Court noted that the NLRA was not designed to preclude states
43 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 217 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 3, at 373.
44 Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,

403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971).
45 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
46 Id.

§ 158(a)(1).

47 Id.

§ 160.

48 See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 77476 (1947).
49 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
50
51
52
53

Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.

Id.
Id. at 746.
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from enacting legislation that prohibited or regulated activity involving threats of violence.5 4 According to the Court, a state was
not prevented from exerting its police power unless Congress
clearly manifested such an intent. 55 Sustaining the order of the
state board, the Court
concluded that such an intent was absent
56

in the instant case.

Three years later, in Hill v. Florida,5 7 the Supreme Court was
confronted with another state statute that regulated labor union
activities. The conflict in Hill involved a Florida statute that required business agents of all labor unions to be licensed. 58 The
statute prevented, however, the licensing of, and thereby the
union representation by, anyone who had not been a United
States citizen for more than ten years, who had been convicted of
a felony, or who was not considered by the state to be a person of
good moral character. 59 Furthermore, it required every labor
union operating in Florida to file with the Secretary of State a
written report that disclosed certain information concerning the
union's management and membership. 60 Finally, the statute
treated any violation of its provisions as a misdemeanor.61
In refusing to uphold the state statute, the Supreme Court
focused on the "full freedom" of workers to select their representatives, as expressly guaranteed by the Wagner Act. 62 The
majority explained that " '[f]ull freedom' to choose an agent
means freedom to pass upon that agent's qualifications.

' 63

Inso-

far as the Florida legislation limited a union's choice of an agent,
the Court believed that it substituted the state's wisdom for the
workers' judgment and, consequently, was preempted by section
7 of the NLRA.64 In addition, the statute's filing requirement was
54 Id. at 748.
55 Id. at 751.
56 Id. at 749.
57 325 U.S. 538
58

Id. at 540.

(1945).

59 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 481:04 (1941)).

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 481:06 (1941)).
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 481:14 (1941)).
Id. at 541. Although the NLRA was explicitly directed toward management
abuses and infringements of employees' rights, the Court extended this prohibition
to the state acts as well. Id. at 546. It is a point that was not discussed at length, but
one that has been followed by the Court. See Cox, supra note 3, at 1345.
63 Hill, 325 U.S. at 541.
64 Id. at 542. Specifically, the Court noted that the statute "as applied . . .
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' " Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter rejected the notion that Congress
60
61
62
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not upheld because the sanction imposed for failure to comply
was inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective
65
bargaining.
The rationale of the Hill majority appeared again, two years
later, in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board.66
New York had adopted a labor statute essentially identical to the
NLRA, its Federal counterpart.6 7 In determining the units of
representation for bargaining purposes, however, the state law
was more liberal insofar as it recognized foremen as a separate
and distinct bargaining unit; consequently, its constitutionality
was challenged. 68 The Supreme Court, in striking down the state
law, reasoned that Congress had intended to occupy the field and
that state action in the area therefore was preempted. 69 The majority stated that where Congress had left the employer/employee relation free of regulation, Federal policy was
indifferent toward state intrusion. 70 The Bethlehem Steel Court
concluded, however, that where the Federal government had, as
here, made comprehensive regulations governing the subject
matter under dispute, state regulation could not supplement that
scheme, even if the Federal statute had not yet dealt with the particular matter.7 ' A presumption arose, according to the Court,
that the national legislation consciously kept some areas unregu72
lated, to the exclusion of state interference.
In 1947, the same year that Bethlehem Steel was decided, Congress once again made a foray into the labor field by passing the
Labor Management Relations Act 73 (LMRA). Experience had
shown that unions were capable of equally pernicious behavior
had intended to occupy the field, arguing that the mere presence of the Federal
government did not give rise to an inference of exclusivity. Id. at 552 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). According to the dissent, unless Congress manifested an unambiguous purpose to this effect, preemption would only be invoked where the conflict
with valid state power was direct and irreconcilable. Id. at 554 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
65 Id. at 543.
66 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
67 Id. at 769.
68 Id. at 770.
69 Id. at 776-77.
70 Id. at 772.
71 Id. The Court also argued that two administrative bodies created a potential
conflict which was enough to trigger preemption since action by the state board
necessarily denied the discretion of the other. Id. at 774. The Court recognized

that if the state board followed the NLRB, its actions would be of no real value; yet,
if it did not, it would create an unconstitutional conflict. Id. at 776.
72 Id. at 774.
73 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-187 (1976).
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toward both employers and employees."4 Consequently, the
rights of employees established in the NLRA were qualified and
regulated by the LMRA. Although a union's right to strike was
upheld in this legislation, certain prerequisites were established
for strikes involving contract termination or modification. 75 In
addition, section 303 of the LMRA specifically prohibited certain
concerted activities, including "secondary strikes."176

Further-

more, the LMRA amended section 10(a) of the NLRA, allowing
the Board
to cede its jurisdiction, in most cases, to any state
77
agency.

One of the first cases to examine the effect of the amended
labor scheme upon the actions of states was International Union of
United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v.

O'Brien.78 At issue in O'Brien was the constitutionality of a Michigan labor mediation law that forbade strikes or lockouts. 79 A
peaceful strike, instituted by the Union, complied with the relevant provisions of the LMRA but violated the Michigan statute;
the appellants, therefore, faced criminal prosecution. 0 In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the LMRA
preempted the state law. Examining the LMRA, the Court concluded that none of its provisions could be read as allowing conInstead, the Court determined
current state regulations.8 '
Congress had chosen to occupy the field, closing it to state
intervention. 2
In distinguishing Allen-Bradiey, the O'Brien Court noted that
labor violence, which was subject to state police control, was
74 Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 321 (1971).
75 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). One of the prerequisites is the submission of disputes to
the newly created Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to assist in dispute
resolution. Id. § 158(d)(3).
76 Id. § 187. A "secondary strike" has been defined as any combination if its
purpose and effect are to coerce customers or suppliers through fear of loss or
bodily harm to withdraw their business relations from an employer who is under
attack. Wright v. Teamsters Union Local 690, 370 U.S. 613, 620 (1950).
77 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). The amendment was made in response to the Bethlehem
Steel decision. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 7 (1957).
78 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
79 Id. at 455.
80 Id.at 456 n.2.
81 Id. at 457.

82 Id. Even if conflict analysis were used, however, the Court concluded that it
still would have prohibited the state act since the strike vote provisions adopted by
the state had been specifically rejected by Congress. Id. at 458. Consequently, the
state statute was "at war" with the Federal law and could not survive. Id. at 458-59.
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outside the occupied field of Federal regulation.8 3 Additionally,
the Court suggested that, when the NLRB " 'has no authority
either to investigate, approve, or forbid the union conduct in
question,' " there is no existing or possible conflict between state
and Federal action-" '[the] conduct is governable by the state or
it is entirely ungoverned.' "84
Until 1953, the majority of the Supreme Court decisions in
the labor preemption area were concerned with restrictions on
the employees' section 7 rights to associate, to choose bargaining
representatives, and to use concerted activities to settle disputes
concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. In Garner v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 776,85 however, the Court shifted its fo-

cus to state power to regulate prohibited activities. In Garner, a
union picketed the premises of a trucking firm whose workers
were not members of the Teamsters local. 86 In seeking injunctive relief, the employer alleged that the activity was a secondary
strike prohibited under the NLRA and under Pennsylvania law.
In concluding that the state injunction had to be denied, the
Court emphasized the apparent purpose of Congress-to create
a uniform system of regulation-and it stressed the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. 88 The majority further stated that, in matters covered by section 8, the possibility of conflict with Federal
legislation precluded multiple tribunals.89
Despite the Court's emphasis on the need for uniformity of
jurisdiction in order to avoid possible conflicting administrations
of Federal labor policy, it was forced to limit that principle one
year later in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction

Corp.9"
before
clusive
action

Justice Burton, speaking for the majority, saw the issue
the Court as whether the LMRA gave the NLRB such "exjurisdiction over the subject matter of a common-law tort
for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court

Id. at 459.
Id. (citing International Union UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 254 (1949)).
85 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
86 Id. at 486-87.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 490.
89 Id. at 490-91; accord Capital Serv. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 504 (1954) ("But
where Congress[] . . . vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a
subject matter and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of functions, the
federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in order to preserve the federal
right.").
90 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
83
84
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from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Act."' TheJustice determined that the LMRA had not. 92 The majority distinguished
Garner because, there, the LMRA had provided a Federal administrative remedy supplemented by judicial procedures for its enforcement, whereas the only remedy available in the instant case
was the traditional state court procedure. 93 Denial of the construction company's right of recovery would have given the
Union immunity from liability. 4 Additionally, the Court noted
that the legislative history of section 8 suggested that Congress
intended that the section's prohibitions of violence and threats of
physical harm would supplement state law.95 Accordingly,
although the activity which created the basis for recovery in the
state action was also prohibited by section 8, the judgment was
not preempted. 96
The Laburnum Court's concern for a lost right of recovery
was absent in the Court's treatment of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Board.97 In that case, the United Steelworkers of America, as bar-

gaining agent for the employees of a local Utah manufacturer,
filed charges of unfair labor practices with the NLRB.98 Since the
defendant company's operations were predominantly local in
91 Id. at 657. The damages arose during the Union's efforts to force the construction company to recognize that organization as the sole bargaining agent for
its employees. Id. at 658. Threats of violence compelled the company to abandon
its work projects. Consequently, it lost profits. The state trial court upheld a jury
verdict of compensatory and punitive damages amounting to approximately
$275,000. Id. The Union's activity was assumed by the Court to violate section 8
prohibitions. Id. at 660-61.
92 Id. at 657.
93
94

Id. at 663.

Id. Compare International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958) (reinstatement of expelled union member and damage award for violation
of rights conferred by union constitution upheld on rationale that state tribunal was
competent to "fill out" reinstatement remedy by utilizing "comprehensive relief of
equity" which NLRB did not fully possess) with Local 24 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (application of state antitrust law to collective
bargaining agreement denied because it would wholly defeat congressional purpose of promoting collective bargaining).
95 Laburnum, 347 U.S. at 668.
96 Id. at 669. In a dissent, Justice Douglas argued that since the subject conduct
is "the stuff out of which labor-management strife has been made," the Federal
labor legislation precluded state action. In addition, because the purpose of the
legislation is to provide the means for orderly settlement of controversies, on a
basis of equality, prolonged litigation in the state courts would disrupt that balance
by "keeping old wounds open, and robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects it was intended to have." Id. at 670-7 1. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
98 Id. at 5.
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character, the National Director of the NLRB declined jurisdiction under recently revised standards. 9 9 Nevertheless, the Board
did not cede jurisdiction to Utah, as it could have pursuant to
section 10(a) of the NLRA.' 00 Having been denied relief at the
Federal level, the union turned to the Utah Labor Relations
Board and obtained an injunction.' 0 '
The Guss majority examined section 10(a) of the NLRA and,
interpreting the legislative history of that provision, determined
that it was the sole means by which states, otherwise excluded
under the Garner analysis, could act in a field occupied by the
NLRB.10 2 Although this view worked a hardship upon the Union,
the Court reasoned that Congress had demonstrated that it knew
how to cede jurisdiction to the states; accordingly, any resulting
difficulties were a matter of congressional, not judicial,
03
concern.
The development of the labor preemption doctrine went
one step further in the pivotal case of San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon. 11 4 Respondents, partners in a lumber business,
were requested by a union to retain only those employees who
were members of its organization."0 5 The employer refused,
claiming that the union had not been designated by the employees as a collective bargaining agent. 10 6 Peaceful picketing by the
rejected union followed.'0 7 The respondents sought relief from
both a California state court and the NLRB."0 8 Because the
amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet Board
standards, the Regional Director denied jurisdiction. 0 9 The California court, however, granted monetary damages and enjoined
the union's conduct. 1 0 The union sought to set aside thejudg99 Id. The Director also commented that it did not appear that further proceedings "would effectuate the policies of the Act." Id.
100 Id. at 6.
101 Id. at 5.
102 Id. at 10-11. ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the Court, noted that Congress
had considered the possibility of no jurisdiction being exercised, but did not adjust
the section 10(a) amendments to eliminate this "no-man's land." Id.
103 Id. at 9-10. This problem was subsequently ameliorated by section 14(c) of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1976).
104 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
105 Id. at 237.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 238.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 237-38.

1985]

NOTES

669

ment, claiming that the Wagner Act precluded the state from regulating its conduct. 1 '
In finding the state act preempted, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated that the essential judicial concern in
labor preemption cases was to avoid potential conflict between
Federal and state regulation concerning rules of law, of remedy,
and of administration of labor policy." 2 The Garmon Court held
that the state action was preempted since the exercise of state
power threatened to impinge upon national labor policy. 113 Accordingly, in the absence of a "clear determination" by the
NLRB that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited by the
NLRA, the conduct sought to be controlled cannot be regulated
by a state if "such activity is arguably within the compass of § 7 or
§ 8 of the Act." '"1 4 Nevertheless, the Court determined that an
exception to this rule arose when either the regulated activity was
"a merely peripheral concern of the [Federal labor legislation]
• . . [o]r [it] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the Court] could not infer that Congress had
deprived the States of the power to act.""'15 Since the picketing
involved in Garmon was neither "arguably prohibited" nor "arguably protected," ' 1 6 and none of the exceptions applied, the
California judgment was vacated.' 17
The same year Garmon was handed down, Congress turned
its attention once again to the field of labor relations. This time
it sought to control internal union affairs by regulating the rights
and responsibilities of union members by enacting the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act" 8 (LMRDA). Title I
of the Act provides a bill of rights which sets out the fundamental
Id. at 244. The Supreme Court granted certiorari twice. The first time, it
'''
decided that the Guss rationale denied exercise of the state's injunctive powers since
the violative activity constituted an unfair labor practice. Because of uncertainty of
the viability of the judgment for damages under state law, though, the case was
remanded. On remand, the California court sustained the damage award. The
opinion discussed herein is pursuant to a second certiorari. Id. at 238-39.
112 Id. at 241-42.
113 Id. at 246.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 243-44.
116 Id. at 244. At the time of the decision, there was doubt about whether picketing activity by stranger unions was considered protected by section 7, prohibited
under section 8, or outside both sections. See Cox, supra note 3, at 1348-49.
117 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246.
118 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
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rights enjoyed by a union member within his organization.' 19
Concern for the potential preemptive effect of the bill upon state
remedies prompted Congress to include a savings provision in
section 103.120 Title IV contains certain restrictions and qualifications for union officers, including the prohibition of certain exfelons from serving a union in an official capacity. 12 ' Despite
these provisions, the Act nevertheless preserves state jurisdiction
of criminal actions. 1 22 This deference to state criminal remedies
law conis also reflected in section 603(a), which preserves 1state
23
officers.
union
of
obligations
fiduciary
the
cerning
One of the first opportunities for the Court to examine the
effect of the LMRDA on its labor preemption doctrine arose in
DeVeau v. Braisted.' 24 Due to the prevalent problem of corruption
in the waterfront area between New York and New Jersey, those
states made a concerted effort to remedy the worsening situation.' 25 After extensive investigations on the problem were completed, the states entered into an interstate compact, which
established a bi-state agency, the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor, with power to license, register, and regulate waterfront employees. 1 26 In conjunction with the bi-state agreement,
New York enacted legislation that prohibited convicted felons
119 Id. §§ 411-414. These rights include: "equal rights," id. § 411(a)(1), and
"the right to meet and assemble freely." Id. § 411 (a)(2).
120 Id. § 413. This section provides that "[n]othing contained in this subchapter
shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any
state or federal law or before any court or other tribunal or under the constitution
and by-laws of any labor organization."
121 Id. § 524(a). This section provides that:
No person . . . who has been convicted of, or served any part of a
prison term resulting from his conviction of a group of serious felonies
• . . shall serve ... (1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any
executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer or other employee . . . other than as an employee performing
exclusively clerical or custodial duties of a labor organization . . . for
five years after . . . such conviction or after the end of such
imprisonment.
Id.
122 Id. § 524. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or diminish
the authority of any state to enact and enforce general criminal laws .... ." Id.
123 Id. § 523(a). This section provides in pertinent part: "Except if explicitly
provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization ... under the laws of any State.... .Id.
124 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
125

Id. at 147.

Id. at 149. The enabling interstate compact received congressional approval
in accordance with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
126
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from acting as union officials. 12 7

The state restriction on convicted felons was challenged in
DeVeau by a union official and others who argued, relying in part
upon Hill, that the legislation was preempted by sections 1 and 7
of the NLRA and section 504(2) of the LMRDA.1 21 In refusing to
strike New York's provision, Justice Frankfurter, in a plurality
opinion, 129 felt that the relevant inquiry was whether the Court
could "fairly infer a congressional purpose incompatible with the
very narrow and historically .explained restrictions upon the
in § 8 of the New
choice of a bargaining representative 3 embodied
0
York Waterfront Commission Act."'

In finding no inference of incompatibility between the state
enactment and Federal labor policy, Justice Frankfurter discussed
the extensive proceedings leading up to the interstate compact. 13 1 Moreover, he emphasized the problem of criminal elements on the waterfront, noting that Congress had approved
both the bi-state compact and the mutual reform effort in general. 132 The plurality therefore concluded that the state's restrictions were not preempted by the NLRA. 133 The Hill decision was
distinguishable from the one at bar, according to Justice Frankfurter, because, in the former, Congress had not approved a state
legislative program, nor was there the same "legitimate and compelling state interest . . . in combating local crime infesting a

particular industry"' 134 as was present in DeVeau.
In DeVeau, the union official also argued that since section
504(a) of the LMRDA had already established restrictions on
holding union office, states were impliedly barred from varying
or supplementing it. 13 The Court was not persuaded by this argument, however, and reasoned that section 504(a) demonstrated that the preclusion of ex-felons from serving as union
officers was not contrary to Federal labor policy.136 According to
Justice Frankfurter, the fact that Congress had explicitly pre127
128

DeVeau, 363

U.S. at 145.

Id. at 151.

129 Justices Whittaker, Stewart, and Clark joined Justice Frankfurter. Justice
Brennan concurred, and Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black dissented. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision.
130 DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 153.
131 Id. at 153-55.
132 Id. at 155.
133
134

Id.
Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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cluded state interference in two of the LMRDA's provisions was a
clear demonstration that when Congress intended to preempt
state action it did not leave that conclusion to inference. 137 Congress's sensitivity to preemption problems was further demonstrated, the plurality felt, by sections 603(a) and 604, which
explicitly preserved the state criminal laws. 138 It concluded,
therefore, that no inference could possibly 139
arise that section 8
was impliedly preempted by section 504(a).
Four years later, Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton 4 o presented an
issue to the Court which Garmon had failed to resolve: whether or
not a state act that was arguably neither protected nor prohibited
by section 7 of the NLRA might nevertheless be preempted. In
Morton, an employer brought an action against a union for alleged secondary activities used during a contract dispute between
the parties. 14 ' The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found that the respondent's union employees
had encouraged the employees of certain suppliers to force their
management to cease doing business with the respondent, in violation of section 303 of the LMRA.' 4 2 Furthermore, the same
union had directly convinced the management of other companies to stop dealing with the employer. 43 This action, while not
a violation of section 303, was nevertheless prohibited by Ohio
law.""' The Federal court therefore awarded damages for both
violations, and the union challenged this decision.' 4 5
The majority opinion upheld the district court's finding regarding the section 303 violation, 146 but the state law award of
damages by the Federal district court was the real issue of contention. 14' The employer had argued that the application of the
Garmon rule would not preclude the state judgment since the vio137 Id. at 156. Justice Frankfurter was referring to sections 205(c) and 403 of the
LMRDA. Id. at 157 n.2.
138 Id. at 157.
139 Id. Justice Douglas, dissenting, insisted that Congress did not intend to infringe upon the full freedom afforded by section 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 161-62
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In fact, he felt that section 2(a) of the NLRA explicitly
preserved the employees' freedom of choice against interference by state regulation. Id. at 164 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
141 Id. at 253.
142 Id. at 256.
143 Id. at 255.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 255-56.
146 Id. at 256.
147 See id. at 257.
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lative act was not arguably protected or arguably prohibited by
the NLRA.' 48 The Court, however, refused to adopt this logic
and found that, although the activity was originally outside the
scope of either sections 7 or 8, it was still necessary to determine
whether, by enacting section 303, Congress had intended to occupy the field to the exclusion of state regulations.' 4 9 The ultimate determination, therefore, was "whether the application of
state law in this kind of case would operate to frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation."' 150 Concluding that state intrusion here would so frustrate Federal labor policy, the Morton
Court noted that Congress had used section 303 to strike a balance between the interests of management and labor; accordingly, weapons of self-help not prohibited were intended to
remain available to achieve either party's goals.' 5 1 The Ohio law,
the majority observed,
impermissibly affected the congressionally
52
imposed balance. 1

The Garmon doctrine again was discussed in Linn v. United
Plant Guardworkers Local 114.153 At issue was the applicability of a

state's common law rule of defamation to certain hostile and vituperative verbal exchanges that had occurred during a collective
bargaining campaign. 154 The Supreme Court noted that section
8(c) of the NLRA, which specifically discusses self-expression in
the context of unfair labor practices, provides that any expressions of opinions or ideas " 'shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice . .

if such expression[s] contain no

threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.' "-155 Despite
this manifest intent of Congress to encourage free debate, the
majority held that the parties are not permitted to injure each
156
other intentionally by making false and insulting statements.
While recognizing that not all defamation was per se actionable,
since due deference had to be given to the intent of Congress to
provide an open forum, the Linn Court nevertheless concluded
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 259-60.
152 Id. at 260; cf Hanna Mining Co. v. MEBA, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) (state court
injunction of peaceful picketing activities, which violated state law but was determined by NLRB to be legal, upheld by Court since union representing supervisors
was outside protection of NLRA).
153 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
154 Id. at 55.
155 Id. at 58 n.3 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964)).
156 Id. at 61.
148
149
150
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that an overriding state interest in protecting
its residents from
15 7
malicious libel should be recognized.
Despite recurring criticism of the Garmon doctrine, 158 the
Supreme Court continued to uphold it as dispositive in the labor
preemption area. The debate over its viability was discussed
again at length in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway
and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge.' 5 9 There, the Court was

confronted with a situation in which a union had breached a contractual obligation in a manner that was arguably an unfair labor
practice under section 8 of the NLRA.' 60 The Supreme Court of
Idaho had upheld a judgment for compensatory damages, arguing that the state common law of contracts was not displaced by
the Federal labor legislation.' 6 ' The Supreme Court, in reversing, reestablished the applicability of the Garmon principles to the
controversy and sought to clarify the jurisprudential basis upon
which that doctrine rests.' 6 2 The majority emphasized that the
primary role of national labor law was to give a basis for stabilizing labor disputes by providing a "delicately [structured] balance
of power among competing forces," a task that the Court
thought common law courts and state governments were "illequipped to perform."' 63
While conceding that the Garmon doctrine was not perfect,
the majority stated that it did provide a reasoned principle which
incorporated the essential aims of Congress.' 64 Accordingly, insofar as Lockidge involved activities within the "arguably prohibited" branch, the state court's decision upholding the application
of contract law to the facts had to be vacated.' 65
157 Id. The Court adopted by analogy the malice test of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to effectuate the statutory design with respect to
preemption. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.
158 See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,
397 U.S. 195, 201-02 (White, J., concurring).
159 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
160 Id. at 282-83.
161 Id. at 282.
162 Id. at 285-86.
163 Id. at 287.
164 Id. at 302.
165 Id. at 305. An extensive dissenting opinion criticized the Garmon rule, questioning especially the majority's stress upon a need for uniformity of forum in order
to avoid " 'incompatible or conflicting adjudications.' " Id. at 315 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Garner, 346 U.S. at 490-91). The dissent argued that certain factors served to demonstrate that the principle of uniformity, perceived by the
majority as a manifestation of congressional intent is "at best a tattered [rule], and
at worst little more than a myth." Id.at 319 (White, J., dissenting). These factors
included: (1) the deference to the arbital forum in section 301(a) of the LMRA;
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Even though the Lockridge Court had concluded that "the basic tenets of Garmon should not be disturbed,"'' 66 the Court once
again re-examined the rule five years later in Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 1 67 The petitioner Union and the respondent, its
employer, failed to agree upon the renewal terms of an employment contract. 68 After the original contract had expired, the
employer demanded some changes in working hours, provoking
the Union to strike.' 69 The employer subsequently filed charges
with the NLRB, later dismissed by the regional director, claiming
unfair labor practices. 70 Shortly thereafter the employer turned
to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, seeking an
injunction. 17' Since the Union's activity was neither arguably
protected nor arguably prohibited by the NLRA, the Commission
applied state law, which treated such conduct as an unfair labor
practice, and granted an injunction.'7 2 The state's highest
court
73
upheld the order, and the Supreme Court reversed.
In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan found that two distinct branches of labor preemption law had emerged from earlier
decisions. First, he noted those cases that had based preemption
upon the need for uniformity of administration through the
NLRB-the Garmon line. 74 Second, the majority perceived a
separate line of analysis that focused upon whether or not the
conduct in question was intended by Congress to remain unfettered by state action, so as to promote the labor balance struck by
the legislature. 75 The activity in Lodge 76 was outside the scope
(2) Congress's grant of a Federal cause of action for parties injured by secondary
union activity under section 8(b), even though subject to parallel and possibly inconsistent NLRB determinations; (3) the rejection by Congress of the holding in
Guss which created a jurisdictional no-man's land in the name of uniformity of law
and administration; and (4) other exceptions carved out by the Garmon rule, such as
in Linn and Laburnum. Id. at 314-16 (White, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissent maintained that it is wrong to exclude state jurisdiction over activity that is arguably protected by section 7, since a hearing on such
activity is virtually impossible unless one deliberately commits an unfair labor practice. Id. at 327 (White, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 303.
167 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
168 Id. at 135.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 135-36.
171 Id. at 136.
172 Id. at 136-37.
'73 Id. at 136.
174 Id. at 138.
175 Id. at 146.
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of Garmon insofar as the NLRB had determined that it did not
violate section 8 provisions and thus was not arguably prohibited; nor was the activity in Lodge 76 arguably protected by section 7.176 Nevertheless, the state's attempt to impose its own
concepts of unfair labor practice on the parties in conflict was
disallowed by the Lodge 76 Court, which determined that Congress had intended to preserve the coercive economic measures
that were not explicitly prohibited in section 8.1 77 Thus, according to the Court, even if a state act avoids exclusion under the
Garmon rule, it still may be displaced if it limits or extends the
economic "self-help" weapons that Congress intended to remain
78
unregulated. 1
Another exception to the Garmon rule was created in Farmer
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25,179 in which a union
member was awarded compensatory damages by a California trial
court because his union had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon him.' 8 0 After the California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 8 '
Even though the activity in question was within the scope of
Garmon, the Farmer Court saw the dispute as fitting into the cate82
gory of cases where a strong local state interest was present.1
Analogous to state court actions redressing injuries caused by violence or threats of violence, actions involving a strong local
state interest, the Court determined, could be decided without
looking at the merits of the underlying labor controversy because
there would be no undue interference with the effective administration of the Federal scheme.' 3 The majority did note, however, that in order to avoid a realistic threat of interference,
"proof that defendant intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct" was necessary to support the tort action; whether a union
"discriminated or threatened to discriminate" against an employee should not be considered. 8 4 Because the trial court had
Id. at 153.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 150-51.
179 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
180 Id. at 293-94. In his charge to the jury, the trial judge failed to give the requested instruction to ignore any evidence pertaining to discrimination in employment opportunities or hiring procedures. Id.
181 Id. at 295.
182 See id. at 305.
183 Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
184 Id. at 305.
176
177
178
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not made this distinction when it charged
the jury, the matter was
8 5
remanded for further consideration.1
Before 1978, state acts that infringed upon a union's right to
picket were preempted unless there was violence or such a threat
to public safety so as to take the conduct out of the scope of the
Garmon rule.18 6 It was significant, then, that in Sears Roebuck & Co.
v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,'8 7 the Supreme

Court sustained a state court injunction88 that barred peaceful
picketing on the respondent's premises.
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, noted that the state
law violation that prompted the litigation was not the picketing
activity, which would be under NLRB jurisdiction, but was instead the location of the activity.' 89 The Court rejected a strict
and mechanical application of Gannon, preferring instead to examine the interests involved and the effect of upholding state jurisdiction upon the administration of national labor policy.'

90

Because the controversy that the petitioner could have brought
before the NLRB was different from that presented to the state
court, Justice Stevens concluded that the state trespass claim
would create no realistic risk of interference with the Board's primary authority over unfair labor practices.' 9'
The decision of Local 926, International Union of OperatingEngineers v. Jones19 2 provided a recent example of the labor preemption approach that has been utilized by the Supreme Court.'9 3
185 Id. at 307-08.
186 See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters,
187 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
188 Id. at 184.

Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

189 Id. at 185-86.
190 Id. at 188-89.
191 Id. at 198. In a dissenting opinionJustice Brennan rejected what he saw as an
abridgement of the Garmon rule. Because both the objective and the location of the
peaceful pickets were arguably protected under section 7, the dissent insisted that
an appropriate application of Garmon would render the state court powerless to
enjoin the Union's efforts. Id. at 215-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf Pacific Gas &
Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1715
(1983) (California statute that conditions construction of nuclear plants on adequacy of nuclear waste storage facilities not preempted by Atomic Energy Act of
1954 because, while Federal Act exclusively regulates construction safety, focus of
state act was on economic viability of nuclear plants).
192 103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983).
193 The case involved a supervisor who filed charges with the NLRB against his
union, alleging that an agent of the organization had " 'maliciously and with full
intent, intimidated and coerced' " the worker's employer into breaching his employment contract. Id. at 1457 (citation omitted). The regional director rejected
the claim; instead of appealing, the supervisor sought and received a judgment
from the state court, which the Supreme Court vacated. Id. at 1463.
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The Local 926 majority first determined whether the conduct regulated by the state was actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRB.' 94 If so, the Court explained, the state action
was prohibited unless the conduct was only of peripheral concern
to the Act or "touche[d] on interests so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the state of the power to act."' 1 9 5 In applying
this standard to a state regulation, the Court weighed the harm to
the Federal labor scheme-caused because the state act negated
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board or because the state's substantive rules conflicted with those of the NLRA-with the signif1 96
icance of the state action.
The Supreme Court decisions not only illustrate the efforts
of that tribunal to administer the dictates of the supremacy clause
in the field of labor regulations, but also represent the judicial
precedents that were to guide the Court in its decision in Brown.
Examining the governing principles of Federal preemption, the
Brown Court stated that state action is displaced where Congress
has explicitly or impliedly occupied a field of regulation 197 or
where a state's efforts actually conflict with those of its Federal
counterpart. 198
These principles, the Court explained, were equally controlling in the field of labor law. 19 9 Focusing on section 7 of the
NLRA, Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, maintained
that that provision is void of either express preemptive language
or of any other language that would indicate a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of labor-management relations.2 z°
Nevertheless, the Justice continued, where state action interferes
with the exercise of the federally protected rights created by section 7, it constitutes an actual conflict and consequently is proId. at 1458.
195 Id. at 1459.
196 Id.
194

197 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185-86. The Court cited Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983), in support of this proposition. Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 318586. In Shaw the Court determined that New York's human rights law, which prohibited discrimination in employment, was preempted with respect to benefit plans
regulated by ERISA only insofar as it prohibited practices that are lawful under
Federal law. Shaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2906.
198 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3186.
199 Id.

200

Id.
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hibited by the supremacy clause.20
The plurality distinguished preemption effected on these
grounds from preemption that is based upon the primacy of the
NLRB acting as the chief administrator and interpreter of Federal labor policy.20 2 Only in the latter context, Justice O'Connor
insisted, may the Court balance the related interests of the Federal government and the deeply rooted concerns of the states.203
Consideration of states' interests, however, is inappropriate
where state law regulates substantive rights that are actually protected by Federal law. 204 The proper framework for analysis in
this case, the plurality concluded, was the determination of
whether the Casino Act actually conflicted
with the section 7
20 5
rights of the casino industry employees.

Turning to the analysis of the court of appeals, the plurality
rejected that court's assertion that section 7 gave employees an
unfettered right to choose their collective bargaining representatives; Justice O'Connor felt that the Hill decision, upon which the
court of appeals had relied heavily, was no longer dispositive, in
view of Congress's subsequent actions-chiefly the enactment of
the LMRDA-which manifested an intent to allow some state
regulation to touch upon the specific rights of employees in certain instances.20 6 Specifically, the plurality reasoned, section
603(a) of the LMRDA preserved the operation of state laws as
they pertained to the responsibilities and qualifications of union
representatives. 0 7 Justice O'Connor saw a further demonstration of this intent in the fact that the disqualification criteria of
section 504 are predicated on state criminal law.20 8 In addition, a
review of the underlying purpose of the LMRDA-to control
rampant union crime and corruption-convinced the Court that
Congress would permit the states to effect different and stricter
Id.
Id. at 3186-87.
Id. at 3187.
Id. The plurality noted that the Court, in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962),
had observed that " [the relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material . . . for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the Federal law
must prevail.' " Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3187 (quoting Free, 369 U.S. at 666). In Free,
the Court invalidated a state community property law that, in effect, prohibited a
married couple from taking advantage of the survivorship benefit incident to their
United States Savings Bonds, as provided by a treasury regulation. Free, 369 U.S. at
670-71.
205 Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3187.
206 Id. at 3188.
207 Id. (citing DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 157).
208 Id.
201
202
203
204
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requirements, consistent with the Federal design, for union officers.20 9 The Court decided that the congressional approval of
the bi-state compact at issue in DeVeau, in addition to the DeVeau
decision to uphold New York's provisions regulating union officials, supported the conclusion that "New Jersey's regulation of
the qualifications of casino industry union officials does not actu210
ally conflict with § 7 and so is not preempted by the NLRA."
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the plurality insisted that
NewJersey's imposition of a collection ban might nonetheless be
preempted if the trial court had found that the ban effectively
prevented Local 54 from serving as the employees' elected bargaining representatives. 2 1 Because this factual determination
had not been made by the district court, however, the Court remanded the case to the lower Federal court to make the requisite
findings.21 2 In a final word of direction, the plurality suggested
that even if the dues collection ban were found to conflict impermissibly with section 7 rights, an alternative sanction might nevertheless be properly employed to enforce New Jersey's
disqualification criteria, provided that, in regulating the union officials, the state did not "so incapacitate Local 54 as to prevent it
from performing its functions as the employees' chosen collec-

tive-bargaining agent."213
Justice White, writing for the dissent, agreed with the plurality that Congress's enactment of the LMRDA demonstrated that
Federal labor law does not preclude states from limiting the class
of individuals eligible to serve as union representatives. 21 4 However, because the New Jersey scheme directly sanctions the
Union and not the offending bargaining representatives, Justice
White maintained that the state statute effectively prevented Local 54 from operating as a collective bargaining unit, thus nullifying the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights.2 1 5 It was not
necessary, Justice White insisted, to remand for factual findings
since, as a matter of law, section 93b impermissibly impaired the
Union's functioning as a representative body and therefore
Id. at 3188-89.
Id. at 3189-90.
Id. at 3190-91.
Id. at 3191-92.
Id.
Id. at 3192 (White, J, dissenting).
Id. The dissent suggested that if NewJersey were to impose sanctions directly
upon the union officers who violate section 86 criteria-such as fines or criminal
penalties-the state action would not be preempted. Id. at 3192 n.l (White, J.,
dissenting).
209
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should be stricken.2

The Supreme Court's treatment of Brown heralds a significant but unexplained departure from the line of cases developed
under the rubric of Federal labor preemption. Although the
Court draws upon traditional Federal preemption principles in
reaching the Brown decision, the Court's rigid analysis in Brown
not only ignores prior Supreme Court holdings, but also is inherently inconsistent within its own terms.
It is well understood that ascertaining the intent of Congress
regarding the range and scope of its labor regulation is a difficult,
if not impossible, task; the sheer expanse and complexity of the
Federal labor scheme,217 coupled with the conflicting inferences
which arise from its provisions, 21" have left the Court with a woeful lack of guidance.2 19 Consequently, the Court has had to fashion constitutional standards from its own perceptions of
congressional purpose; not surprisingly, it has been wrong on
occasion.22 °
Id. at 3193 (White, J., dissenting).
See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240 (discussing difficulty of assimilating "new and
complicated" legislation).
218 Congressional silence has been viewed both as evidence of an intent to preempt, and, alternatively, as an indication that displacement is not appropriate. For
example, in Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951), the decision turned, in
part, upon the failure of Congress to cede jurisdiction to the state courts in matters
concerning public utilities. Amalgamated Ass'n, 340 U.S. at 397-98. The Amalgamated
Ass'n Court reasoned that Congress's failure to reverse prior Supreme Court decisions, which had preempted state action under similar facts, indicated that the Federal legislature wholly supported the Court's preemption analysis in those prior
cases. Id. The opposite approach was taken in DeVeau, in which the plurality refused to infer preemption from section 504 of the LMRDA because "when Congress meant pre-emption to flow from the 1959 Act it expressly so provided."
DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 156.
At least one commentator has criticized the Court for reading too much into
congressional silence. See Cox, supra note 3, at 1376-77. Professor Cox suggests
that congressional inaction may simply result from an unwillingness to make controversial changes in the absence of strong public opinion. Id.
219 See Garner, 346 U.S. at 488 ("The [LMRA] . . .leaves much to the states,
though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from
conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still
permissible."); see also Linn, 383 U.S. at 58 ("Our task is rendered more difficult by
the failure of Congress to furnish precise guidance in either the language of the Act
or its legislative history.").
220 See, e.g., Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 315-16 (White, J., dissenting). After the Court
in Guss created a jurisdictional "no-man's" land by holding that states were powerless to intervene in labor disputes where the NLRB possessed jurisdiction, even if
the NLRB declines to assert its jurisdiction, see supra note 102 and accompanying
text, Senator Ervin referred to that holding as " 'a stench in the nostrils of justice.'" Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 316-17 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 6544 (1959)). The
216
217
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Over time, the presumed intent of Congress concerning labor policy essentially has been reduced to judicially-created standards.2 2 ' Out of this effort to fashion effective standards, the
Garmon rule was created. When established, it was, in the view of
the Court, an approach that best accommodated the goals of the
222
NLRA and the traditional police powers vested in the states.
The Garmon rule, as such, was not simply another alternative
analysis briefly entertained by the Court, but was instead the definitive standard of preemption concerning the relationship be223
tween state law and Federal labor policy.
The Brown Court referred to the Garmon rule as being exclusively applicable to that strand of labor preemption analysis that
is based on the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB; in so doing, it
greatly diminishes the role that Garmon has played in the Court's
labor preemption decisions. As announced by previous holdings, Garmon has been used to include situations involving actual
conflict as well. As recently as 1983, the Court, in Local 926, reaffirmed the Garmon standard as the definitive and well-settled approach to the labor preemption issue.2 2 4
Because the Garmon rule is workable but imperfect, 5 the
Court has refrained from applying it "in a literal, mechanical
fashion. ' ' 2 26 The cases have demonstrated that, generally, as
long as the doctrine is consistent with the underlying purpose of
the NLRA-to strike a balance between the conflicting and often
hostile interests of unions and employers 22 7 -the Garmon rule has
been strictly applied; however, when its application is contrary to
Federal labor policy, the Court has adjusted the doctrine. In
Lodge 76, for example, the activity in question was not arguably
within sections 7 or 8 because the NLRB had declined to treat the
NLRA was amended to correct the Guss decision by providing for state jurisdiction
over certain matters the NLRB declines to adjudicate. See id. at 317.
221 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 241 (" '[T]he statutory implications concerning what
has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic
nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of [litigation].' ") (quoting
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958)); Lockridge,
403 U.S. at 303 (labor preemption is "largely ofjudicial making").
222 See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 290-91; Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242.
223 See Sears, 436 U.S. at 189; Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292.
224 See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of Local 926.
225 See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 303.
226 Sears, 436 U.S. at 188; see also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977) ("Our cases indicate, however, that inflexible application
of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest
.
in regulat[ing] the conduct at issue ....
227 See Morton, 337 U.S. at 260.
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union activity as an unfair labor practice.228 Nevertheless, because of the exclusive control of the NLRA over the subject area,
the Court determined that a state cause of action should be precluded because allowing the labor practice was essential to the
"balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests [of
labor and management]. 22 9
Whenever the Garmon rule created an unreasonable hardship
upon individuals because its strict application denied them access
to a tribunal, the rule has been criticized. 23" Additionally, the
exceptions to Garmon have been sufficiently flexible to reflect the
Court's changing attitude towards states in the federal balance. 2 3 Instead of changing the rule, the Court has widened the
scope of the "merely peripheral" and "deeply rooted" exceptions. 2 32 Thus, the Garmon rule has been fashioned not only to
accommodate the jurisdictional primacy of the NLRB, as the
Brown Court suggests, but also to address what constitutes an actual conflict between state and Federal substantive rules, and to
assess the degree of conflict necessary to tip the constitutional
balance in favor of either the Federal or state interest.
It is somewhat disingenuous of the Brown Court, then, to ignore the flexible Garmon standard when determining whether the
New Jersey legislation should be preempted by section 7 of the
NLRA. This is especially made clear by the Court's subsequent
analysis of the LMRDA. The plurality extensively examines the
legislative history of that act, as well as the trail of inferences left
by Congress in the LMRDA's provisions, in order to reach the
conclusion that section 7 of the NLRA does not necessarily and
obviously conflict with state regulation.2 33 This effort to ferret
congressional intent from the underlying labor legislation is precisely the judicial task that generated the Garmon rule after an arduous, lengthy litany of precedents.23 4
Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 136-37.
Id. at 147 (citing Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-59
(1964)).
230 See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,
397 U.S. 195, 202 (1970).
231 See Note, supra note 1, at 636-39.
232 Although the state's interest in preserving the public from violence and
threats of violence has been long recognized, the degree of imminent peril to a
state's citizens required to invoke an exception to the Garmon rule has been lowered. Id. In Linn, intentionally false statements were enough, Linn, 383 U.S. at 62;
in Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), the infliction of emotional stress sufficed. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305.
233 Brown, 104 S.Ct. at 3190.
234 The Court in Garmon concluded that it was judicially impossible to devine
228
229
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By ignoring Garmon principles, however, the Court raises
questions as to the future of Federal labor preemption under the
aegis of Garmon. Whether or not an actual conflict 2 35 exists between section 7 rights and the Casino Act's sanctions on union
officials, it appears that the New Jersey legislation at least affects
the arguably protected rights of the unions to choose their own
bargaining representatives. Accordingly, even if some direct
conflict with the substantive provisions of section 7 were not
found, the Court should have nevertheless engaged in the Garmon analysis to determine whether the state's sanctions encroached upon the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The plurality's decision to remand the case to the district
court in order to determine whether the dues collection ban "will
so incapacitate ' 236 Local 54 as to prevent it from performing its
functions as the employees' chosen collective-bargaining agent
leaves the result of this decision in question.23 7 More significantly, however, the Brown Court's apparent narrowing of the
Garmon rule's importance in adjudicating preemption issues involving the NLRA raises serious doubts as to the direction and
future of the Court's labor preemption doctrine.
Gordon W. Thomas
legislative purpose from the "new and complicated legislative scheme" that the
NLRA had promulgated. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240; see Note, supra note 1, at 635-36.
To delve once again into the murky waters of congressional intent, as the Brown
Court apparently did, is to ignore the import of Garnon and its progeny.
235 The Brown Court did not make clear whether "actual conflict" refers to a conflict with the NLRA's purpose, the NLRB's jurisdiction, or some substantive right
arising from the Federal scheme. This unclarity further clouds the Court's standard. See Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3185-87.
236 Id. at 3191.
237 There is some indication that the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement will ask the Casino Control Commission to proceed directly against the Local
54 officials who fail to meet section 86 criteria instead of resorting to the dues
collection ban, see Star-Ledger, Aug. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 4; thus, the Brown decision
will not result in a final disposition of the constitutional issue. Id.

